The Security Situation in Eritrea, its Implications to the Region, and its Challenges to the Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The Centre for Policy Research Dialogue (CPRD), based in Addis Ababa, and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), based in Pretoria, South Africa, organized a workshop on “Promoting Security Sector Reform in the Horn of Africa”, in Addis Ababa: 13-14, July 2006. The workshop attracted a broad attendance from across Africa with lead speakers from members of parliaments, civil societies, and the IGAD countries. The discussions focused on post-conflict stability, civil-military relations, defence, and security - in order to explore the challenges around promoting SSR in the Horn of Africa. The following is my contribution to the workshop. …………………………………………………………………………………………………...

Introduction

For almost five decades the states of the Horn of Africa have been in the throes of a continuous internal instability, regional, and international crises. One of the main causes of political instability, the protracted Eritrean revolution, and the response of two successive Ethiopian governments, was rounded off with the independence of Eritrea. The first Ethiopian Revolution, conducted against the emperor, was also a source of internal instability. Finally, there was the second Ethiopian Revolution conducted by the TPLF against the Derg (the military/communist dictatorship). In addition to the internal factors of instability, we mentioned above, there were intermittent wars between Ethiopia and Somalia. The scope and scale of these conflicts were so devastating that the scarce human and natural sources of life sustenance were decimated. A programme that envisions constitutional, democratic, and public control of the security sectors of our region is certain to go a good distance towards improving the dismal human condition of our region. 

 My approach in dealing with Security Sector Reform issues regarding Eritrea shall be:

 1) To describe the security sector issues in Eritrea as they stand

2) To describe the security issues involving our region, and

3) To identify lessons learnt and relate them to challenges of the Security Sector Reform.

 1. The Historical Context

 1.1 The Strategy of the Peoples War and the Militarization of Eritrean Society

In 1961, Eritrean nationalists resorted to the strategy of armed struggle in order to achieve national independence. The strategy of a people’s war as applied in Eritrea, (a small country with scant resources and without external support) led to an extreme form of self-reliance that, in its turn, led to the militarization of Eritrean society.  

The twofold aims of the initial guerrilla army: a) to function as a propaganda vehicle among the people, and b) to recruit fighters from the peasantry, were intended to challenge the security system of the Ethiopian state. These small-scale military actions challenged the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state in such a way that a substantial amount of the national development and welfare funds were deflected to the needs of modernizing its internal and external security sectors. As a result, an unstoppable, cycle of armament and rearmament was launched. The process of the militarization of Eritrean society was completed when the Eritrean guerrilla armies were transformed into standing armies. In the context of the militarization of Eritrean society, the ‘Yekealo’ (the guerrilla fighter, and the ‘Warsay’ (the soldier of the Eritrean/Ethiopian war) are, today, presented as bearers of the highest national values in Mr. Issayas’ Eritrea. 

 

1.2 Personality cult

Intoxicated by the achievement of national independence, the Eritrean people gave a Blanc Check to Mr. Issayas to do with Eritrea as he willed. Having secured the unquestioning adulation of the masses, Mr. Issayas went about, unhindered, building a one man, one party, state. Mr. Issayas’ militarized nationalism was fast upstaging civilian values; the next step taken by the leader of the EPLF was to cultivate the cult of personality. From the moment Mr. Issayas captured power, he launched a campaign of adducing to himself, the myth of the ultimate hero of the Eritrean Revolution. This militaristic ideological form, combined with the cult of personality that accompanied it, prepared the way for one of the most violent dictatorships in the history of our region.

2. The Guerilla State

 2.1 From the Guerrilla Army to the Guerilla State

The Eritrean People’s Liberation Army (EPLA) became the manpower resource of the newly born state. The transitional parliament was composed, mainly, from the ranks of the EPLA - as the transitional government was formed from the high ranks of the EPLA. The middle echelons took over the internal and external security institutions; whereas, the political cadres occupied the civil services. In short, the Eritrean state was captured by the Eritrean People’s Army (EPLA).

In 1994, at the 3rd Congress of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Mr. Issayas was able to remove the historical leadership of that organization from his government, and to replace them by a group of cadres who were absolutely dependent on him, To make matters clear, he substituted the EPLF by an organization of his making – baptized the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). He legitimized the new power structure by putting up a brand new parliament (composed of his military and civilian supporters) and formed a provisional government composed of second rank, yes, men. As a final step in the legitimization of the new power base, he set up a constitution drafting committee that drew its inspiration from the constitution of the People’s Republic of China (the country where he acquired his basic military training). The draft Eritrean constitution is still gathering dust. From 1997 onwards, it can be safely asserted that Eritrea was transformed into a guerrilla state - run by a guerrilla army. Henceforth, the Eritrean people referred to Mr. Issayas as the ‘Dictator’.  

2.2 Identifying the Dictator’s Strategy

The Eritrean dictator reverted to the strategy of the people’s war against his own people - a strategy that is outright incongruous in an already independent country. The aim of the dictator was to grasp Eritrea as his private fiefdom, by transforming it into a military base area of the era of national liberation wars. In order to achieve this aim the dictator replaced the military, vertical, command structure of the Ministry of Defense, by a horizontal command structure of military governorships of the provinces.

 This strategy, in addition to camouflaging the fact that the Eritrean state has collapsed, was intended to impose a total dictatorship in Eritrea, and initiate an undeclared state of war against our immediate neighbors. Looked at from the point of view of the neighboring countries, the dictator intends to keep a permanent state of tension directed at their strategies of development.

From the economic point of view, the dictator introduced the party command economic policy organized around party/military farms, party banks, and party commercial establishments. The free labor market was replaced by military indentured labor. It is no exaggeration to state that in Eritrea the laws of an organized national economy have been replaced by a party command economy. Secondary students sit for their university entrance exams at the military camps of Sawa. The population at large is in a state of semi-starvation. The youth flee from their country in large numbers, never to return to the hell that Eritrea has become. Recently, twenty two Eritrean youth died in the Mediterranean on their flight to Europe.

The transformation of the military command structure of the Eritrean army into the institutions of a people's war made it possible for the dictator to maintain a vast army on a war footing, at low cost. Out of the fifteen years of nominal, independent, statehood, eight of them have been wasted on wars of aggression against the Yemen, Ethiopia, and the Sudan. This incongruity testifies that Eritrea is a failed, terrorist, state. The sooner the international community is aware of this situation, the greater the possibility of denying the Eritrean dictator international legitimacy. 

From the ideological point of view, the dictator attempts to present the picture of an Eritrea under siege as an excuse of recruiting an endless supply of teenagers in the army - from the schools and the labor market.

From the human rights point of view, the people have become hostages of the system more than ever; half of the Eritrean government has been thrown into jail for advocating political pluralism; there is no democratically elected parliament; and the independent newspapers have been closed while their editors have either escaped or vegetate in prison. The Eritrean human rights issue is often compared to that of Pol Pot’s Cambodia.

3. The Regional Security Complex

3.1 Issayas’ War in Yemen

The Eritrean/Yemen war came without warning; everybody assumed that the question of territorial integrity between these two states was settled amicably. The Eritrean people came to know about the conflict only after war broke out. Issayas could have preserved Eritrean/Yemeni lives, scarce resources, and regional amity with our Arab neighbours. Experience has shown that the Eritrean dictator’s first response to a crisis situation is the hard, violent, solution. The Eritrean/Yemeni conflict could have been solved peacefully and bilaterally. 

3.2. Issayas’ Conflict with the Sudan

The blanket condemnation of former liberation organizations as fifth columnists was intended to exclude tens of thousands of Eritreans from returning home for fear of loosing their lives. One of the reactions to Issayas policy of exclusion was the establishment of large Eritrean opposition force in the Sudan. Issayas’ regime responded to this challenge by severing diplomatic relations with the Sudan and initiating a policy of supporting Sudanese opposition forces financially and militarily.    

3.3 Issayas’ War with Ethiopia

As with the Yemen and the Sudan, the Eritrean people assumed that Ethiopian/Eritrean relations were in good shape. Political observers of the region were perplexed by the fact that the two forces that fought side by side, appeared to have enviable state relations, and were perceived to belong to the same ethnic pool, were not able to resolve their differences amicably. The Badume conflict and its generalization into the entire Eritrean/Ethiopian border represented the last straw in the incremental economic, political, and diplomatic provocations on the part of the Eritrean dictator.

The US/Rwanda proposal (whose aim was to bring the Eritrean and Ethiopian sides to the negotiation table) was rejected by the Eritrean dictator in his televised ‘the sun shall never set in Badume….’ Speech.

The Ethiopian parliament responded by announcing a war of self-defence; and thus laid the national and international legal basis for a drawn out war. The Eritrean dictator’s failure to grasp the seriousness of Ethiopia's announcement of war, and the preparedness of its armed forces, led him to the pitfalls of war against a sisterly nation and a brotherly people.   

3.4 Not Quite but Something Akin to Terrorism

The dictator transformed Eritrea into a base area (replete with military, financial, and propaganda support system) of the major rebel forces of our region. Many in our region regard this type of activity as state belligerence by other means; it may be added that there are many others who call it by its name – state terrorism. 

4. Challenges to the Security Sector Reform

4.1 Lessons Learnt

The lessons we have learnt from the Eritrean experience are dismal:

   4.2 Promoting Security Reform in Eritrea

As it should be clear by now the only security sector reform which is needed in Eritrea is the policy of putting an end to the dictatorial system. This goal may be achieved by a) the selective support of opposition parties in order to promote a social revolution inside the country, b) the mobilization of regional and international pressure for the implementation of democratic elections in dictatorial Eritrea, and c) organizing a caretaker government in exile. Due to the fructuous character of the so-called Eritrean opposition, such a government may be built on the basis of General de Gaul’s Résistance model during the 2nd World War. That is to say, such a government needs to be established around political personalities who have the support of the Eritrean people, and the confidence of our region. The multiple, quarrelsome, opposition organizations may form an Eritrean parliament in exile.

5. Some Conceptual Considerations

The essence of the concept of Security Sector Reform aims at the democratization of the armed establishment in the developing world. The normative language of this complex programme reflects the established constitutional relationship of the democratic state to the military establishment. In Eritrea, the dictatorial system is couched in the language of ‘nation building’ as a legitimating ruse.  

The stated aim of the Eritrean dictator is to strengthen the material base of Eritrea by rapid industrialization and modernization via a fictitious project of nation building; his immediate goal, however, is to ascertain an exclusive political/military control over the Eritrean territory.

The leaders of the Eritrean guerrilla state promote the program of nation building as a source of political legitimacy. In the name of securing the future, they dissipated the present; in the name of national unity, they launched civil wars; in the name of territorial correctives, they warred against their neighbours.

The unbearably expensive security and military apparatus of Eritrea has isolated it from the states of the Horn of Africa. Yes, the welfare fund of Eritrea has been dissipated by the military adventures of the Eritrean dictator. 

Herui T. Bairu

Addis Abeba

06-13-07